Why Can Only 24% Solve Bayesian Reasoning Problems in Natural Frequencies: Frequency Phobia in Spite of Probability Blindness by Weber, Patrick et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 12 October 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01833
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1833
Edited by:
Gorka Navarrete,
Adolfo Ibáñez University, Chile
Reviewed by:
Laura Felicia Martignon,
Ludwigsburg University, Germany
Luana Micallef,
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
*Correspondence:
Patrick Weber
patrick.weber@ur.de
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 16 March 2018
Accepted: 07 September 2018
Published: 12 October 2018
Citation:
Weber P, Binder K and Krauss S
(2018) Why Can Only 24% Solve
Bayesian Reasoning Problems in
Natural Frequencies: Frequency
Phobia in Spite of Probability
Blindness. Front. Psychol. 9:1833.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01833
Why Can Only 24% Solve Bayesian
Reasoning Problems in Natural
Frequencies: Frequency Phobia in
Spite of Probability Blindness
Patrick Weber*, Karin Binder and Stefan Krauss
Mathematics Education, Faculty of Mathematics, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
For more than 20 years, research has proven the beneficial effect of natural frequencies
when it comes to solving Bayesian reasoning tasks (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995).
In a recent meta-analysis, McDowell and Jacobs (2017) showed that presenting a task
in natural frequency format increases performance rates to 24% compared to only 4%
when the same task is presented in probability format. Nevertheless, on average three
quarters of participants in their meta-analysis failed to obtain the correct solution for
such a task in frequency format. In this paper, we present an empirical study on what
participants typically do wrong when confronted with natural frequencies. We found
that many of them did not actually use natural frequencies for their calculations, but
translated them back into complicated probabilities instead. This switch from the intuitive
presentation format to a less intuitive calculation format will be discussed within the
framework of psychological theories (e.g., the Einstellung effect).
Keywords: Bayesian reasoning, natural frequencies, probabilities, einstellung, tree diagram
INTRODUCTION
Many professionals, such as medical doctors and judges in court, are expected to make
momentous decisions based on statistical information. Often, Bayesian inferences are required,
for example when a radiologist has to judge and communicate the statistical meaning of a positive
mammography screening. Many empirical studies have documented faulty inferences and even
cognitive illusions among professionals of various disciplines (Hoffrage et al., 2000; Operskalski
and Barbey, 2016). In the medical context, the consequences are particularly severe because many
patients are mistakenly found diseased, which can entirely change their lives (Brewer et al., 2007;
Gigerenzer et al., 2007; Salz et al., 2010; Wegwarth and Gigerenzer, 2013). Similarly, insufficient
knowledge of statistics in general and incorrect Bayesian reasoning in particular can result in false
convictions or acquittals made by juries in court, for example when they have to evaluate evidence
based on a fragmentary DNA sample. These faults bear the risk of destroying innocent people’s
lives, too, as happened, for instance, in the famous case of Sally Clark (Schneps and Colmez, 2013;
Barker, 2017).
Typically, the statistical information that the aforementioned professionals are confronted with
is provided in probability format, that is, fractions or percentages describing the probability
of a single event, for example the prevalence of breast cancer in the population. Generally,
in situations where Bayesian inferences are necessary, three pieces of statistical information are
given: the base rate (or a priori probability), sensitivity, and false alarm rate. Consider, for instance,
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the heroin addiction problem (adapted from Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995):
Heroin addiction problem (probability format):
The probability of being addicted to heroin is 0.01% for a person
randomly picked from a population (base rate). If a randomly
picked person from this population is addicted to heroin, the
probability is 100% that he or she will have fresh needle pricks
(sensitivity). If a randomly picked person from this population is
not addicted to heroin, the probability is 0.19% that he or she
will still have fresh needle pricks (false alarm rate). What is the
probability that a randomly picked person from this population
who has fresh needle pricks is addicted to heroin (posterior
probability)?
With the help of Bayes’ theorem, the corresponding posterior
probability P(H|N), with H denoting “person is addicted to
heroin” and N denoting “person has fresh needle pricks,” can be
calculated.
P (H|N) =
P(N|H) · P(H)
P (N|H) · P (H) + P(N|¬H) · P(¬H)
(1)
=
100% · 0.01%
100% · 0.01% + 0.19% · 99.99%
≈ 5%
Given the probabilistic information (the low base rate, high
sensitivity, and low false alarm rate), the result of only 5%
seems astonishingly low to most people—professionals and
laypeople alike. In fact, only very few—on average as few as 4%
of the participants included in a comprehensive meta-analysis
(McDowell and Jacobs, 2017)—are able to draw the correct
inferences necessary to come to the right conclusion in such
Bayesian tasks. The vast majority of people have difficulties,
which can result in severe misjudgments.
The reasons for this poor performance in Bayesian reasoning
are widely discussed. One explanation is the neglect of the
base rate, which can be very low in many Bayesian situations
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Bar-Hillel, 1983). This leads to
much greater estimates for the posterior probability, which is
consistent with most people’s intuition. Further reasons for the
poor performance include participants neglecting the false alarm
rate P(N|H) or confusing the false alarm rate with the posterior
probability P(H|N) (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995) as well as
participants overweighing the sensitivity (e.g., McCloy et al.,
2007).
In order to prevent dangerous misjudgments due to faulty
Bayesian inferences, the concept of natural frequencies has
proven to be a powerful instrument (e.g., Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995; Siegrist and Keller, 2011). Natural frequencies
can be obtained by natural sampling (Kleiter, 1994) or,
alternatively, by translating probabilities (e.g., “80%”) into
expressions consisting of two absolute frequencies (e.g., “80 out
of 100”; for a discussion on the equivalence of natural frequencies
and probabilities, see section Present Approach). Consider once
again the heroin addiction example, this time, however, in natural
frequency format:
10 out of 100,000 people from a given population are addicted to
heroin. 10 out of 10 people who are addicted to heroin will have
fresh needle pricks. 190 out of 99,990 people who are not addicted
to heroin will nevertheless have fresh needle pricks. How many of
the people from this population who have fresh needle pricks are
addicted to heroin?
With the help of this format, significantly more people find the
correct answer to the problem, which is 10 out of (10 + 190).
As a consequence, performance rates in the frequency format
typically increase to about 24% (McDowell and Jacobs, 2017).
Errors due to base rate neglect as mentioned above occur less
often with natural frequencies, since the base rate need not be
attended to in the frequency version because it is already included
in the information on the sensitivity and false alarm rate. Thus,
Bayes’ modified theorem containing natural frequencies yields
the correct answer of “10 out of 200” in the heroin addiction
problem based on a simpler computation:
P (H|N) =
#(N ∩H)
#(N)
=
10
10+ 190
= 5% (2)
More than 20 years of research have confirmed the benefit
that comes with the concept of natural frequencies in Bayesian
reasoning situations. Laypeople, students, professionals across
various domains (e.g., medicine, law, and management), and
even children perform significantly better when working on a
Bayesian reasoning task that is presented in natural frequencies
instead of probabilities (e.g., Wassner, 2004; Zhu and Gigerenzer,
2006; Hoffrage et al., 2015; Binder et al., 2018).
Additionally, various other factors are known to have
an impact on performance in Bayesian reasoning tasks.
Visualizations, for example tree diagrams (e.g., Yamagishi, 2003;
Binder et al., 2018), unit squares (e.g., Böcherer-Linder and
Eichler, 2017; Pfannkuch and Budgett, 2017), icon arrays (e.g.,
Brase, 2009, 2014) or roulette wheel diagrams (e.g., Yamagishi,
2003; Brase, 2014), have been shown to improve accuracies in
Bayesian situations (for an exception, see, e.g., Micallef et al.,
2012). An overview and categorization of visualizations that were
used to boost performance in Bayesian situations is provided
by Khan et al. (2015). Furthermore, individual differences of
participants, particularly cognitive abilities such as numeracy,
graphicacy, and spatial abilities, certainly have an impact on
performance rates (e.g., Chapman and Liu, 2009; Brown et al.,
2011; Micallef et al., 2012; Peters, 2012; Ottley et al., 2016). In
addition, the specific numerical values for population size, base
rate, sensitivity, and false alarm rate can influence accuracies
(Schapira et al., 2001). Cognitive biases and judgment errors
associated with different numerical information are, for example,
size effect and distance effect (Moyer and Landauer, 1967).
Finally, details of the representation and framing of the problem
text can affect performance in Bayesian reasoning situations
(Obrecht et al., 2012). Ottley et al. (2016), for example, were able
to show that specific problem formulations (e.g., providing all
numerical information in context of the task, that is, not only base
rate, sensitivity, and false alarm rate but also the probability or
frequency of their respective complement) influence accuracies
significantly.
However, instead of contributing to the abundance of
empirical studies replicating and discussing the beneficial effect
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1833
Weber et al. Frequency Phobia and Probability Blindness
of natural frequencies or other factors (e.g., Hoffrage et al., 2002;
Pighin et al., 2016; McDowell et al., 2018), in this article we
will focus on the other side of the coin, that is, on the 76%
of participants in these studies (on average in McDowell and
Jacobs, 2017) who failed to solve Bayesian reasoning tasks with
natural frequencies. Why can still on average only a quarter
of participants solve the problem correctly, although the task
is presented in the beneficial natural frequency format? Many
psychological theories explain, discuss, and specify in detail
if and why natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian inferences
(e.g., the nested sets-hypothesis or the ecological rationality
framework, see Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1999; Lewis and Keren,
1999; Mellers and McGraw, 1999; Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001,
2002; Hoffrage et al., 2002; Sloman et al., 2003; Barbey and
Sloman, 2007; Pighin et al., 2016; McDowell et al., 2018) and
how additional tools, such as visualizations, further increase
their beneficial effect (e.g., Yamagishi, 2003; Brase, 2009, 2014;
Spiegelhalter et al., 2011; Micallef et al., 2012; Garcia-Retamero
and Hoffrage, 2013; Micallef, 2013; Ottley et al., 2016; Böcherer-
Linder and Eichler, 2017). However, a satisfying answer to the
question why only 24% of participants solve Bayesian reasoning
problems in natural frequency format correctly has not yet been
found.
PRESENT APPROACH
In order to explain why only 24% of participants draw correct
Bayesian inferences when confronted with natural frequencies,
in the present article we take one step back and switch our focus
from performance rates to cognitive processes. In this respect,
some important questions have not been addressed in detail
so far: When given a Bayesian reasoning problem in frequency
format, how do participants who fail to provide the correct
answer approach the task? Where exactly do their calculations
fail and why?
In order to gain a first impression of what participants
might do when confronted with a task in natural frequency
format, we checked the questionnaires from our previous studies
on Bayesian reasoning and natural frequencies (e.g., Krauss
et al., 1999; Binder et al., 2015). Interestingly, we revealed some
instances where participants had not applied the given natural
frequencies but had translated them back into probabilities. In
order to explore this phenomenon in depth, we had a closer
look on what students usually learn about Bayesian reasoning
problems in their high school statistics classes.
Over the past two decades, statistics education has become an
important column in German high school curricula. Here, just
like in other countries, systematic calculation with probabilities
has been in the center of teaching efforts. Alternative formats,
such as natural frequencies, have despite the great amount of
empirical research underpinning their benefits only played a
minor role (cf. the American GAISE recommendations; Franklin
et al., 2007). Even though there are some very recent efforts
to implement the frequency concept in German curricula, for
example in the new Bavarian high school curriculum for grade 10
(ISB, 2016), there still seems to be a tendency that this format is
not accepted as equallymathematically valid as probabilities. This
is supported by our impression from trainings for mathematics
teachers that the concept of natural frequencies is not even
familiar to most teachers. Furthermore, many schoolbooks
tend to solve statistical tasks (not only Bayesian ones) with
probability calculations, even when the task is presented in
absolute frequencies (e.g., Freytag et al., 2008; Rach, 2018).
Another observation we made based on a review of typical
Bavarian school textbooks (Eisentraut et al., 2008; Freytag et al.,
2008; Schmid et al., 2008) and workbooks (Sendner and Ruf-
Oesterreicher, 2011; Reimann and Bichler, 2015) was that the
more advanced students become in their high school career,
the fewer statistical tasks are solved with natural frequencies
by the respective textbooks. In conclusion, high school (and,
consequently, university) students are a lot more familiar with
probabilities than with natural frequencies due to their general
(and sometimes even tertiary) statistical education. This implies
that working with probabilities is a well-established strategy when
it comes to solving statistical problems.
While in many situations people profit from such an
established strategy, in some cases, however, a previously fixed
mindset can block simpler ways to approaching a problem
(Haager et al., 2014). This phenomenon lies at the center of
prominent psychological theories on cognitive rigidity. Consider,
for example, the so-called Einstellung or mental set effect
(Luchins, 1942). When solving a problem, people often rigidly
apply a previously learnt solution strategy while neglecting
possibly important information that would allow an easier
solution. Such an Einstellung or mental set can be developed
through repeated training, enabling the person to quickly solve
problems of the same structure (Schultz and Searleman, 2002;
Ellis and Reingold, 2014; Haager et al., 2014). However, the
downside of these mental sets is that they can make a person
“blind” to simpler solutions or—in the worst case—unable to find
a solution at all.
Themost famous example for the Einstellung effect is Luchin’s
water jar experiment (1942; for more recent studies on the
Einstellung effect in chess players and with anagram problems
see, e.g., Bilalic´ et al., 2008; Ellis and Reingold, 2014). Participants
in Luchin’s study had to work out on paper how to obtain
a certain volume of water using three empty jars of different
sizes for measuring. The first five problems could all be solved
by applying a relatively complicated strategy that was shown
to the participants in an example problem. For the following
five problems, a much simpler solution method was possible.
However, the majority of participants kept using the complicated
strategy they had previously learnt. Moreover, many of them
could not solve the eighth problem at all, for which only the
simple solution strategy was appropriate (Luchins, 1942).
Recent research has shown that even experts can be subject
to the Einstellung effect (e.g., Bilalic´ et al., 2008). Thus, mental
sets developed over a long period of time can also lead to
the blocking of simple solutions (for a detailed discussion of
different aspects of cognitive rigidity see Schultz and Searleman,
2002). The probability strategy, which German students deal with
during their whole high school career, would be an example for
such a mental set that is developed over time. So taken together,
these psychological theories and the strong familiarity of students
with probabilities hint toward a possible answer to the question
what participants might wish to do when they are confronted
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1833
Weber et al. Frequency Phobia and Probability Blindness
with a task in frequency format: They might try to represent the
situation in the much more familiar probability format in order
to be able to use established probabilities for their calculations.
Such an Einstellung toward calculating with probabilities
instead of natural frequencies would take away all benefits that
come with the frequency concept. Calculating with probabilities
in a Bayesian context—even though the task is provided in
frequency format—has the consequence that the intuitive natural
frequency algorithm [formula (2)] is no longer available, the
more complicated probability algorithm [formula (1)] has to be
applied, and people are no longer able find the correct solution.
Thus, the Einstellung effect might explain why on average
three quarters of participants fail with natural frequencies. In
the same line, we assume that it is very unlikely that people
translate probabilities into natural frequencies when given a task
in probability format—despite over 20 years of research on the
beneficial effects of natural frequencies.
Here, the question might arise whether the two formats
can actually be considered equivalent. In this respect, both
mathematical and psychological aspects need to be addressed.
First, we will shed light on the respective mathematical
frameworks both formats operate in and to what extent these
frameworks can be considered equivalent. Second, we will
analyze the equivalence of probabilities and natural frequencies
from a psychological viewpoint.
Even though the two formats seem to follow different rules,
from amathematical perspective they can be defined analogously.
Weber (2016) showed that natural frequencies can be embedded
in a theoretical framework that is isomorphic to a probability
space, that is, the structure at the basis of probability theory
can be constructed in a similar way for natural frequencies.
Thus, all fundamental mathematical properties of probabilities,
for example closure, commutativity, and associativity of their
addition, can theoretically also be assigned to natural frequencies
(for details, see Weber, 2016). Therefore, the two concepts
can be considered equivalent, implying that natural frequencies
are an information format just as mathematically valid as
probabilities.
However, regardless of this theoretical equivalence of the
two formats, a certain psychological uneasiness about the
equivalence of natural frequencies and probabilities still seems
to exist. It can be speculated that students who do not
know about the mathematical framework of the frequency
format might switch from natural frequencies to probabilities
not only because they think that a probability algorithm
is the only or the easiest way to solve the problem but
also due to this subtle feeling of uneasiness, which stems
from the assumption that natural frequencies are not a
mathematically valid tool for solving Bayesian reasoning
tasks. The latter implies that participants—even if they
realize that a solution can be derived very easily by using
natural frequencies—might think that a mathematically justified
argumentation requires reasoning in terms of probabilities.
All three assumptions (probabilities are the only, the easiest
or the only allowed way) might trigger participants to
rely on their Einstellung instead of actively using natural
frequencies.
To be clear, we theoretically consider natural frequencies as a
superordinate concept for both “expected” and “empirically
sampled” frequencies. Expected frequencies constitute
frequencies expected in the long run (cf. Hertwig et al.,
2004; Spiegelhalter and Gage, 2015; case 2 in Woike et al., 2017)
and are often used for problem formulations in natural frequency
format. In contrast, empirically sampled frequencies are derived
from a natural sampling process (cf. Kleiter, 1994; Fiedler et al.,
2000; cases 1 and 3 in Woike et al., 2017; for a discussion of the
two sub-concepts of natural frequencies, see also Hertwig et al.,
2004; Spiegelhalter and Gage, 2015).
Of course, in the context of possibly switching between the
two formats, besides the information format of the task, also
the format in which the question is asked has to be taken
into consideration (for a discussion on other details of textual
problem representation, see, e.g., Ottley et al., 2016). It has to
be noted that several studies (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby, 1996;
Evans et al., 2000; Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001; Sirota et al.,
2015) suggest that a question format that does not match the
information format of the task reduces the natural frequency
facilitation effect (Ayal and Beyth-Marom, 2014; Johnson and
Tubau, 2015). However, only few studies directly test such
incongruent problem and question formats (McDowell and
Jacobs, 2017).
We also do not want to examine incongruent formats (or
other factors mentioned above) systematically (e.g., in order to
boost performance), but rather aim to implement a question
format as neutral as possible that allows for both answer
formats simultaneously. Our interest is to observe and analyze
a substantial amount of participants for all four possible cases,
namely those who stay with the given format (probability or
natural frequency) and those who switch to the other format for
their calculations, in order to learn from the respective cognitive
processes about possible mechanisms underlying the choice of
calculation format.
Since in our questionnaires from previous studies (Krauss
et al., 1999; Binder et al., 2015), it was not always possible to
judge which calculation format a participant applied, we will
now explicitly ask participants to write down their solution
algorithm in order to capture cognitive policies. Thus, in the
present study we enter new research fields by investigating
potential preferences in calculation format—when a problem
introduction and question format as neutral as possible are
given—that become visible by the way participants try to solve
a given Bayesian task.
Our research questions are:
• Research question 1: Do participants show a general
preference of the probability format over natural frequencies
that becomes manifest in a strong tendency to
a) keep working with probabilities if a task is given in probability
format, although a sample population is provided
b) even translate a task given in frequency format into
probabilities, if the question allows for answers in both
formats?
• Research question 2:
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a) Regardless of the format in which the task is presented, do
participants who work on this task actively using natural
frequencies make more correct Bayesian inferences than
participants who make their computations with probabilities?
b) If questions allow for answers in both formats, which factor
predicts correct Bayesian inferences better—the format that
the task is presented in (presentation format) or the format
that participants actively use for their calculations (calculation
format)?
Regarding research question 1, we hypothesized that participants
do show a strong preference of probabilities over natural
frequencies in both presentation formats. We further assumed
that this preference has indeed a detrimental effect on
performance in Bayesian reasoning tasks.With regard to research
question 2, we therefore hypothesized that actively working with
natural frequencies is a stronger predictor for correct inferences
than the presentation format of a task.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
To examine these research questions, we conducted an empirical
study with a first sample (N = 114) in 2016 (see section
Participants). In the light of the current debate on the replication
crisis (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015), we decided to
check the robustness of the results obtained with another sample
(N = 69) with the same materials and design in 2017/2018. Three
participants from the second sample were excluded from the
analysis because they indicated that they had already participated
in the first sample. Since we detected the same effects for both
samples independently, we report the results for the combined
sample of N = 180 (see section Results).
Method
Participants in our study had to work on two Bayesian reasoning
tasks with different scenarios (heroin addiction problem and
car accident problem, adapted from Gigerenzer and Hoffrage,
1995) and different numerical data (for design see Table 1 and
for problem wordings see Table 2). These two contexts were
chosen since they are not as common as, for example, the famous
mammography problem, and thus, the chance of a participant
already knowing the task beforehand was small. Moreover, both
problems refer to daily-life situations, so the participants were
expected to have no difficulties understanding the scenarios. One
of the two Bayesian problems was presented in probability format
and the other one in natural frequency format. We systematically
permuted the order of context as well as information format.
In typical natural frequency versions, the question reads
“How many of the . . . have/are . . . ?,” often followed by a line
“Answer: ____ out of ____.” Note that we are interested in
cognitive processes triggered purely by the presentation format
and not by a provided question or answer format. Thus, in all
natural frequency versions, we wanted to implement a question
format that allows both for probability and for natural frequency
answers. In order to be as neutral as possible, we decided to use
questions for proportions (see Tables 1, 2), which are a common
question format in schoolbooks, too. The question “What is the
TABLE 1 | Design of the implemented problem versions.
Context
Heroin addiction
problem
Car accident
problem
Presentation
format
Probabilities • Introduction: sample
provided
• Presentation format
of the task:
probabilities
• Question format:
probabilities
• Visualization
presented or to be
constructed
• Introduction: sample
provided
• Presentation
format of the task:
probabilities
• Question format:
probabilities
• Visualization
presented or to be
constructed
Natural
frequencies
• Introduction: sample
provided
• Presentation format
of the task: natural
frequencies
• Question format:
proportions
• Visualization
presented or to be
constructed
• Introduction: sample
provided
• Presentation format
of the task: natural
frequencies
• Question format:
proportions
• Visualization
presented or to be
constructed
proportion of people. . . ” can be answered by, for example, “5%”
or by “10 out of 200” and thus is settled in between probabilities
and natural frequencies.
In the probability versions, formulating a neutral question is
rather difficult because a proportion usually refers to a concrete
sample. Thus, instead of making the question format as neutral
as possible, we decided to provide the participants already in
the introduction with a sample population that the probabilities
could be referred to (e.g., “On the internet, you find the following
information for a sample of 100,000 people”). Thereby, we
again allowed for both calculation formats. While in natural
frequency versions the option for probability answers lies in the
neutral question format, a possible natural frequency answer
in probability versions was opened up by providing a concrete
sample in the beginning of the task. It is important to note that we
did not primarily want to compare performances by presentation
format (which would just be a replication of many other studies)
but by calculation format, so a total parallelization of the task
versions was neither necessary nor the optimal design for our
research questions.
Because Bayesian reasoning tasks in German schoolbooks
are usually presented with tree diagrams (Binder et al., 2015),
after the question, we either asked for the construction of a
tree diagram (in the first task) or presented a tree diagram
(in the second task). The aim here was to present stimuli that
are as ecologically valid as possible [with respect to (German)
teaching contexts both in school and in university] and that
provide the option to switch between the two formats. Both at
school and at university level, 2 × 2-tables and tree diagrams are
most commonly used for teaching Bayesian reasoning, whereas
alternative visualizations (unit squares, icon arrays, etc.) are
usually omitted. Since both 2 × 2-tables and tree diagrams allow
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TABLE 2 | Problem formulations.
Heroin addiction problem Car accident problem
Probability version Natural frequency version Probability version Natural frequency version
Introduction Imagine that you randomly meet a person with fresh
needle pricks in the street. You are interested in whether
this person is addicted to heroin. On the internet, you find
the following information for a sample of 100,000 people:
Imagine you see a drunken person getting behind the wheel of his
or her car after a party. You are interested in the risk of a car
accident caused by this person. On the internet, you find the
following information for a sample of 10,000 drivers:
Statistical information The probability that one of
these people is addicted to
heroin is 0.01%.
If one of these people is
addicted to heroin, the
probability is 100% that he
or she will have fresh needle
pricks.
If one of these people is not
addicted to heroin, the
probability is 0.19% that he
or she will nevertheless have
fresh needle pricks.
10 out of 100,000 people are
addicted to heroin.
10 out of 10 people who are
addicted to heroin will have fresh
needle pricks.
190 out of 99,990 people who
are not addicted to heroin will
nevertheless have fresh needle
pricks.
The probability that one of
these drivers will cause an
accident is 1%.
If one of these drivers
causes an accident, the
probability is 55% that he or
she is drunk.
If one of these drivers does
not cause an accident, the
probability is 5% that he or
she is nevertheless drunk.
100 out of 10,000 drivers
cause an accident.
55 out of 100 drivers who
cause an accident are drunk.
500 out of 9,900 drivers
who do not cause an
accident are nevertheless
drunk.
Question What is the probability that
one of these people is
addicted to heroin, if he or
she has fresh needle pricks?
Of the people who have fresh
needle pricks, what is the
proportion of them addicted to
heroin?
What is the probability that
one of these drivers causes
an accident, if he or she is
drunk?
Of the drivers who are drunk,
what is the proportion of
them causing an accident?
Visual aid • First task: construct a tree
diagram
• Second task: consider a
presented tree diagram
• First task: construct a tree
diagram
• Second task: consider a
presented tree diagram
• First task: construct a tree
diagram
• Second task: consider a
presented tree diagram
• First task: construct a tree
diagram
• Second task: consider a
presented tree diagram
Prompt “Please write down your calculations!”
for switching between the two formats (unlike, e.g., icon arrays)
and since tree diagrams but not 2 × 2-tables can be directly
equipped with conditional probabilities, only tree diagrams
remained as visualizations suitable for our study. By using the
latter, our hope was to exploratively shed light on whether a
tree diagram might influence participants’ choice of calculation
format, for example by making the given presentation format
more salient (for tree diagrams equipped with probabilities
or natural frequencies in the heroin addiction problem see
Figure 1). In sum, rather than systematically varying specific
factors (or boosting performance), we wanted (1) to know
how participants reason with the materials usually presented
in German schools and universities, and (2) to observe a
substantial number of people switching or staying with the
presentation format in order to analyze their respective reasoning
processes. For the same reasons, we implemented standard
problem wordings.
Since participants were explicitly asked to write down all
calculations they made in order to solve the task, we were able
to judge precisely and systematically which format they used for
their calculations (see Supplementary Table 2; also see section
Coding).
The paper and pencil questionnaire contained a short
information paper on the study and some general questions,
for example on participants’ age or study program, as well as
the two tasks. Before participants were allowed to start with the
second task, they had to hand in their solution for the first task.
Participants were allowed to use a pocket calculator that was
provided along with the questionnaire. There was no time limit;
on average, participants took approximately 5min to complete
the demographic items and 25min for both tasks.
Coding
The normatively correct solutions of the problems were 5% (or 10
out of 200) for the heroin addiction problem and 9.9% (or 55 out
of 555) for the car accident problem (the results differ marginally
if the task was presented in natural frequencies as opposed to
probabilities, e.g., exactly 10% in the car accident probability
version vs. 9.9% in the car accident frequency version). In order
to guarantee maximum objectivity for classifying the answers as
“correct Bayesian inference” or “incorrect Bayesian inference”
and also for deciding whether either a probability algorithm or
a frequency algorithm had been applied, we used strict coding
guidelines (see Supplementary Table 1), which were applied
by all coders. Since we were especially interested in whether
participants used the correct algorithm for solving the task,
mere calculation or rounding errors were neglected, resulting
in answers that were classified as “correct Bayesian inference”
even though the mathematical result was not entirely correct. In
the same line, answers that appeared mathematically correct at
first glance were classified as “incorrect Bayesian inference” if the
result was just incidentally correct, but a wrong algorithm was
applied (this rarely happened).
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FIGURE 1 | Tree diagrams visualizing the heroin addiction problem equipped with probabilities and natural frequencies.
Furthermore, we focused on the cognitive processes
underlying each response when determining the “calculation
format” of an answer. This cognitive process was measured by
analyzing the exact calculations each participant wrote down to
come to a solution. When a participant used probabilities (or
natural frequencies) only, we classified the solution as “calculated
with probabilities” (or natural frequencies, respectively).
When both formats were clearly visible in the calculations, we
classified the answer according to whether the participant used
probabilities or natural frequencies for the crucial step in the
calculation process, that is, the computation of the denominator
in Bayes’ formula, as can be seen in equations (1) and (2). Thus,
the decisive factor in such unclear cases was the addition of two
absolute numbers (in favor of a frequency algorithm) or the
multiplication of probabilities (in favor of a probability algorithm,
respectively). If, for example, in the heroin addiction problem
a participant used both formats for his or her calculations,
but added two absolute numbers (e.g., 10 + 190) to obtain the
denominator in (2), the answer was classified as “calculated with
natural frequencies”. If, on the other hand, a participant used
both formats, butmultiplied two probabilities (e.g., 0.01× 100%)
like in (1) to obtain the respective probabilities for the numerator
or the denominator, we classified the answer as “calculated with
probabilities” (no participant added frequencies and multiplied
probabilities).
Two raters coded 21% of all inferences
independently according to the coding guidelines (see
Supplementary Tables 1, 2). Since in 100% of all cases the
correctness was rated in congruence (Cohen’s κ = 1; Cohen,
1960), and the calculation format was classified identically in
97% of all cases (Cohen’s κ = 0.95), the remaining inferences
were rated by one coder.
Participants
We recruited N = 114 students from the University of
Regensburg (Bavaria) in summer 2016, and N = 69 in winter
2017/2018 (three of which were excluded from the analysis since
they had already participated in the study in 2016). Most of
these students were enrolled in a teaching math program (N
= 147), while some of them studied economic information
technology, so a certain level of mathematics competency among
the participants can be assumed (see also section Discussion).
They were at different stages of their studies (most of them in
their first two years) and their age ranged from 18 to 38, with
an average of 22 years. Out of the total of N = 180 participants,
121 were female. Since each participant worked on two tasks, we
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obtained a total of 360 Bayesian inferences including participants’
detailed solution algorithms.
The study was carried out in accordance with the University
Research Ethics Standards. Participants were informed that the
study was voluntary and anonymous, and no incentives were
paid. Participants were asked to give their written informed
consent to participate in the study in advance. Thereupon, two
students refrained from participating.
RESULTS
In the following, we report the results for the combined sample
of N = 180 participants, but all detected effects also hold for
both the original (N = 114) and the replication sample (N = 66)
independently. As far as our first research question is concerned,
the results indeed show a strong preference of participants for
calculating with probabilities in both contexts. This is illustrated
by Figure 2, where, for example, P→ F denotes participants who
were provided with a task in probability format but calculated
with natural frequencies. On the one hand, when presented with
a task in natural frequency format (second and fourth bars of
Figure 2), almost half of participants (49%) nevertheless chose
to apply probabilities for their calculations, although the neutral
question explicitly allowed for answers in both formats. On the
other hand, when they faced a probability version of a task (first
and third bars of Figure 2), only 18% across both contexts chose
to translate the problem into natural frequencies—despite the
explicitly given sample population in the introduction. Taken
together, according to our design natural frequencies represented
the preferred calculation format in only about one third (34%) of
all 360 Bayesian tasks although 50% of all tasks were presented in
natural frequency format.
While Figure 2 does not yet display performances, Figure 3
shows performance rates in the resulting four combinations
of presentation format and calculation format (P→P, P→F,
F→F, F→P) for both problem contexts. It becomes clear
that when natural frequencies were actively used for the
calculations, performance rates were significantly higher than
when probabilities were applied. Remarkably, in our design
this holds true almost regardless of the presentation format:
For both problems, the patterns look very similar for the
two presentation formats. The performance in both problems
obviously mainly depends on the calculation format, but only to a
small amount on the presentation format. In the heroin addiction
problem, the difference between both calculation formats is
especially pronounced. The highest performance was detected
when both variables presentation format and calculation format
were natural frequencies (61% correct responses), descriptively
followed by probability tasks that were worked on with
frequencies (53% correct responses). In the two other cases
(when participants calculated with probabilities), performance
rates were considerably lower (13% if the presentation format
was probabilities and 9% if the presentation format was natural
frequencies).
In general, the beneficial effect of presenting natural
frequencies was replicated by our study. While 20% of the
Bayesian tasks in probability format were solved correctly across
both contexts, the performance rate for the tasks presented in
frequency format was 36% (see Table 3). Compared to McDowell
and Jacobs (2017), both of these numbers seem rather high.
An explanation might lie within our sample: more than 80% of
participants were enrolled in a mathematics education program
and might therefore have comparably high numeracy, enabling
them to perform above average in math tasks (for an analysis
of participants’ individual differences and switching behavior
depending on their cognitive abilities, see below). Note that we
also found context effects (36% correct responses in the heroin
context vs. 20% correct inferences in the car accident context).
In order to separate the effects of presentation format and
calculation format, we ran a generalized linear mixed model
(GLMM) with a logistic link function. Here, we specified
probabilities (both as presentation format and as calculation
format) as reference category and included the possible
explanatory factors “presentation format,” “calculation format”
(via dummy coding), and the interaction term of presentation
format and calculation format to predict the probability of a
correct Bayesian inference in our design.
According to the results of the generalized linear mixed
model, the unstandardized regression coefficient for solving
a task that was both presented and calculated in probability
format was significant (b0 = −7.03, SE = 1.32, z = −5.32,
p < 0.001), showing large inter-individual differences (for a
discussion of these results, see below). The (unstandardized)
regression coefficient for the presentation format was non-
significant (b1 = −3.04, SE = 2.00, z = −1.52, p = 0.13),
whereas the calculation format showed a significant regression
coefficient (b2 = 9.85, SE = 3.85, z = 2.56, p = 0.01). Finally,
the interaction of presentation format and calculation format
yielded another significant regression coefficient (b3 = 4.85, SE
= 2.22, z = 2.19, p = 0.03), indicating that calculating with
natural frequencies increases performance even more when the
task is also formulated in natural frequency format (i.e., when
the absolute numbers for the frequency algorithm can be directly
taken from the problem wording).
The strong differences of individual competencies lead to
extreme (unstandardized) regression coefficients in the model.
However, a generalized linear model (neglecting inter-individual
differences) estimated regression coefficients that—converted
into probabilities via the logistic link function—exactly replicated
the performance rates found in our data. This is because the
GLMM accounts for these large differences in performances
by estimating large inter-individual differences between the
participants, as the intercepts (denoting the performances when
presentation and calculation format was probabilities) were
allowed to vary freely between participants. The substantial
influence of the inter-individual differences also becomes
apparent when inspecting the model fit: Whereas 6.5% of the
variance is explained by the fixed GLMM regression coefficients
(marginal R2 = 0.065), the inter-individual differences and
the fixed regression coefficients together explain 68.5% of the
variance (conditional R2 = 0.685). However notably, despite the
large inter-individual differences, the influence of the fixed effects
on the results was clear and strong.
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FIGURE 2 | Calculation format by presentation format and context.
TABLE 3 | Percentage of correct Bayesian inferences by context and presentation
format (independent of calculation format).
Presentation
format
Context Average
Heroin addiction
problem
Car accident
problem
Probabilities 22% (n = 92
inferences)
19% (n = 89
inferences)
20% (n = 181
inferences)
Natural
frequencies
51% (n = 87
inferences)
22% (n = 92
inferences)
36% (n = 179
inferences)
Although we did not explicitly collect data about participants’
cognitive abilities (e.g., numeracy, spatial and graphical literacy),
these inter-individual differences suggested a closer analysis
of our data with this respect. Indeed, we found significant
differences in performance especially between two subgroups of
our sample: TheN = 42mathematics education students aspiring
to teach at the academic school track of the German school
system (Gymnasial students) outperformed the other N = 138
participants significantly (50% correct inferences vs. 21%; t(358)
= 5.294, p < 0.001). We assume that this difference is due to the
higher numerical, spatial, and graphical abilities of the first group,
since they generally outperform the other mathematics education
students in mathematics exams or mathematical knowledge
tests (e.g., Krauss et al., 2008; see also Lindl and Krauss, 2017,
Table 5, p. 396). Moreover, the Gymnasial students receive a
considerably more thorough education in mathematics through
their study program than the rest of our participants. However
interestingly, these differences in cognitive abilities did not have
any influence on calculation format preferences. Both subgroups
tended in a similar way to prefer using probabilities over natural
frequencies for their calculations (32% of Gymnasial students’
solutions were based on a frequency algorithm, whereas 35%
of the other participants calculated with natural frequencies;
t(358) = −0.506; p = 0.613). As a consequence, although
an overall shift of performances might be expected depending
on participants’ cognitive abilities and education, we assume
a certain generalizability of our results across varying abilities
and education levels regarding the switching rates (cf. section
Discussion).
By examining exploratively participants’ reactions on a
presented tree diagram, we revealed several instances where
the participants had added probabilities to the branches of a
tree diagram originally presented with natural frequencies in
the nodes. Conversely, only few of the participants equipped a
tree diagram that was originally presented in probability format
with natural frequencies. When the participants had to construct
actively a tree diagram visualizing the textual problem, we
detected some instances where already before the diagram was
drawn, participants had switched in their calculation format (in
both directions: from natural frequencies to probabilities and vice
versa). Therefore, some participants translated the presentation
format into their calculation format right at the beginning of
their problem solution process. However, since we did not
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FIGURE 3 | Percentages of correct inferences dependent on the presentation and calculation format in both problems.
systematically test versions without a visualization clue, these
findings have to be considered only explorative hints concerning
possible cognitive mechanisms that might lead participants to
stay with a certain format or to switch from one to the other.
These mechanisms will have to be addressed more closely in
future research.
DISCUSSION
In an empirical study with N = 180 students from the University
of Regensburg, we found that the majority of participants do
not actively use natural frequencies in Bayesian reasoning tasks.
Even if the task is presented in the intuitive natural frequency
format (with a neutral question asking for proportions), about
half of the participants still prefer calculating with probabilities
instead. Therefore, and since the “standardized” probability
format is the “sine qua non” in probability theory, the results
of our study reveal the Einstellung effect in Bayesian reasoning
situations (Luchins, 1942; Luchins and Luchins, 1959; McCloy
et al., 2007). We speculate that such an Einstellung might be
enhanced by the still widespread idea that natural frequencies
are not “mathematically correct” enough to actually work with
in high school and university contexts. As a consequence,
participants who might actually notice a possible solution of the
Bayesian reasoning task based on a frequency algorithm might
still rely on probabilities due to a certain kind of “phobia” to use
natural frequencies for their calculations (for a discussion on the
impact of affect on overcoming fixed mindsets, see Haager et al.,
2014)—despite the ever-growing body of research pointing to the
beneficial effects of the frequency concept (e.g., Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995; Barbey and Sloman, 2007; Micallef et al., 2012;
Obrecht et al., 2012; Ottley et al., 2016; McDowell and Jacobs,
2017).
Althoughwith our study, we cannot ultimately decide whether
the Einstellung effect or this kind of “phobia” lies at the heart
of participants’ switching back to probabilities, we want to
emphasize that both formats are mathematically equivalent in
the sense that they can be defined analogously with the same
properties and structure. Whatever the case may be, since recent
efforts to implement natural frequencies in high school and
university curricula appear not to be enough to make people
actively take advantage of their benefits, we vouch for an even
stronger implementation of the natural frequency concept in
secondary education (especially in the higher grades), tertiary
education, and in teacher training.
The Einstellung toward preferring probabilities has a negative
impact on performance rates: participants working with
probabilities perform significantly worse than those who apply
natural frequencies for their calculations. Moreover, at least in
our design, the calculation format is an even stronger predictor
for performance than the presentation format that previous
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research has mainly concentrated on (e.g., Barbey and Sloman,
2007; Siegrist and Keller, 2011). This suggests that participants
who translate natural frequencies into probabilities follow a
path that is disadvantageous in two respects: First, they choose
the unintuitive probability over the natural frequency format,
and second, they are prone to make further mistakes due to
translation errors (that we did not explicitly consider in our
study). Interestingly, a few participants (18%) did translate
probabilities into natural frequencies. This suggests that at
least a small minority is to some extent familiar with the
natural frequency concept. These participants profit indeed from
calculating with natural frequencies since their performance rates
increased substantially compared to performances of participants
who stay with probabilities (13 vs. 53% across both implemented
contexts). This tendency is a first sign that natural frequencies
might become an established solution strategy for Bayesian
reasoning tasks.
It has to be noted that our sample consisted of university
students entirely. Since their mindsets and cognitive abilities
(especially numeracy as well as graphical and spatial literacy)
probably differ from the general population (Micallef et al., 2012),
a different sample might, of course, yield different performance
rates. However, we assume that even though the total population
might generally perform worse than our sample, those using
natural frequencies for their calculations will still outperform
those who resort to probabilities. In the same way, we would
expect an overall shift of performance rates depending on item
difficulty or wording (for factors determining the difficulty
of Bayesian reasoning tasks as well as for different problem
wordings, see, e.g., Ottley et al., 2016), but we assume relative
consistency with respect to format preferences across different
Bayesian reasoning tasks. Future research might investigate in
detail whether our results indicating an Einstellung effect in
Bayesian reasoning situations hold also true when individual
differences and item difficulty are systematically controlled.
The context effects in our study in favor of the heroin
addiction problem could be explained by having a closer
look at the question formulation in the car accident problem.
Here, the two relative clauses in the frequency version (see
Table 2) demand higher verbal processing abilities and thus
make the question harder to understand compared to the
frequency question in the heroin addiction problem (only one
relative clause, see Table 2). Consequently, the heroin addiction
problem presented with natural frequencies yields significantly
higher performance rates than the respective version of the
car accident problem (51% correct inferences vs. 22%; see
Table 3). Moreover, coding in our study was fairly complex (see
Supplementary Tables 1, 2), even though we obtained interrater
reliability scores of κ = 1 for the correctness of a Bayesian
inference and of κ = 0.95 (Cohen, 1960) for determining
the calculation format. In addition, we focused only on the
correct algorithm applied for classifying an answer as “correct”
(see Supplementary Table 1). Thus, we did not concentrate on
calculation errors, including those that resulted from translating
an information format into the other one. Therefore, we did
not systematically detect translation errors dependent on the
respective presentation format, in particular. This, however, is a
conservative approach, since we assume that more people make
mistakes when translating frequencies into probabilities than vice
versa.
Furthermore, in an explorative analysis, we detected several
instances where the participants had equipped a presented
frequency tree diagram with probabilities, suggesting that such
a visualization does not prevent the participants from switching
from the natural frequency to the probability format for their
calculations. We speculate that even the opposite is the case:
Since students are familiar with probability tree diagrams but
not so much with frequency tree diagrams from their high
school careers, the sight of a tree diagram (even though it is
equipped with natural frequencies) might trigger their memories
of the familiar probability trees and might thus provoke them to
fill the diagram with probabilities. Moreover, many participants
equipped the tree diagram they had been asked to draw with their
chosen calculation format—even if the latter differed from the
presentation format. This suggests that the participants tend to
decide on their calculation format right at the beginning of their
solution process. We thus speculate that the exact moment of the
format switch lies immediately after (or even at the same time
as) reading the task. Therefore, further research might investigate
systematically when exactly people decide on the format they
want to use for their calculations and if people possibly alter
their decision during the solution process. In addition, it would
be interesting to determine whether presenting a visualization
such as a tree diagram or actively constructing one enhances
or diminishes the Einstellung effect in Bayesian reasoning tasks
(e.g., by systematically comparing versions with and without
visualization)—and, more generally, whether visualizations affect
the calculation format at all.
The question remains open to what extent natural frequencies
should be implemented in statistics education, since they can
only be used in specific situations (e.g., in Bayesian reasoning
problems or tasks where cumulative risk judgment is necessary;
see McCloy et al., 2007). We suggest that natural frequencies
be taught already at a young age to establish the concept
over a longer period of time. When—at a later stage—the
focus is shifted more and more to probabilities, a permanent
interplay between the two formats seems reasonable. By using
natural frequencies to illustrate, for example, the multiplication
rule or Bayes’ theorem, students can understand the two
coexisting formats as equally legitimate representations for the
underlying concept of uncertainty. Here, natural frequencies can
be used to eliminate typical errors, to make difficult problems
more understandable, and to prevent cognitive illusions. When
probabilities are presented simultaneously, the connection
between the two formats might become more apparent and a
deeper understanding of the concept of uncertainty might be
achieved. In this respect, future work, for example systematic
training studies (cf. Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001), needs
to determine the most successful ways to incorporate natural
frequencies in statistics education at secondary and tertiary level
in order to overcome the Einstellung effect.
Future research on this topic might also investigate in more
detail how much current teachers already know about the
frequency concept in order to decide if natural frequencies
indeed need a stronger focus in teacher training as we suggest.
This could, for example, be realized by systematic teacher
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interviews. Moreover, future research might address empirically
the cognitive mechanisms underlying the Einstellung effect as
detected by our study, that is, whether participants assume that
a probability algorithm is (a) the only way, (b) the easiest way,
or (c) due to a feeling of uneasiness with the frequency concept
the only mathematically allowed way to approach the Bayesian
problem. Here, qualitative methods such as student interviews
might be a valuable tool to clarify situation-specific causes of the
Einstellung effect. Finally, it would be interesting to determine
effective methods (e.g., visualizations or hints in the problem
wording) to prevent people from falling back into probabilities
in Bayesian reasoning tasks.
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